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Bridging Political Divides: Perceived
Threat and Uncertainty Avoidance
Help Explain the Relationship
Between Political Ideology and
Immigrant Attitudes Within Diverse
Intergroup Contexts
Brandon D. Stewart* , Fyqa Gulzaib and David S. M. Morris
School of Psychology, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom
The political divide between liberals and conservatives has become quite large
and stable, and there appear to be many reasons for disagreements on a wide
range of issues. The current research sought to explain these divides and to
extend the Uncertainty-Threat Model to intergroup relations, which predicts that more
dispositional, perceived-threat and uncertainty-avoidance will be related to more political
conservatism. Given that conservatism is also often related to more negativity to low-
status groups such as immigrants, the relationship between political ideology and
negative attitudes toward immigrants may be mediated by more threat and uncertainty-
avoidance. Study 1 tested this mediational hypothesis in a correlational design and
showed that both uncertainty-avoidance and perceived realistic and symbolic threat
significantly mediated the relationship between political ideology and attitudes toward
immigrants, and that perceived threat was the more influential mediator. Study 2
extended threat management to perceived threats from unspecified outgroups, as
opposed to the immigrant outgroup, and it replicated all significant mediations. Study 3
replicated the mediations observed in Studies 1 and 2 for political ideology to attitudes
toward immigrants with uncertainty-avoidance and perceived threat from immigrants
as mediators; it further replicated the mediations to the negative attitudes measure
that had been used in Study 2 and it extended it to an objective and indirect bias
measure [i.e., Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP)]. Overall, almost all of the results
supported the idea that perceived threat and uncertainty-avoidance both mediate the
relationship between political ideology and attitudes toward immigrants, and that threat
management, as opposed to negativity bias, may be a central concern separating
liberals and conservatives. Within all three studies, we also observed more evidence
for the Uncertainty-Threat Model predictions than we did for the alternative Extremity
Hypothesis, which predicted a quadratic relationship between political ideology and
threat and uncertainty, and between political ideology and attitudes toward immigrants.
Keywords: uncertainty, threat, political ideology, intergroup, bias
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INTRODUCTION
The divisions between liberals and conservatives have become
quite large and stable, and are potentially expanding (Koleva
et al., 2012; Hibbing et al., 2014; Jost et al., 2017). Overall,
these political groups tend to disagree on a wide range of issues
that often appear to not have a common underlying motivation
(e.g., same-sex marriage, taxes, flag burning, animal testing,
immigration, etc.). To complicate matters, there are a number
of factors that have been proposed to explain the differences
between these groups including differences in social dominance
orientation (SDO), differences in negativity bias, and differences
in endorsement of moral foundations (Graham et al., 2011; Ho
et al., 2012; Hibbing et al., 2014). We believe that an essential
difference on these divides revolves around threat perceptions
and uncertainty-avoidance.
One promising theoretical model proposes critical differences
that relate to threat and uncertainty, which can shed light
on these political divides, and may help to bridge them and
improve dialogue between ideological groups (Jost et al., 2003,
2017; Jost and Napier, 2012). In their Uncertainty-Threat Model
research, Jost et al. (2007, 2017), Jost and Napier (2012) provide
some evidence that liberals and conservatives differ in their
attention to and management of threats (i.e., Threat Management
related to perceived terrorism, belief in a dangerous world,
or death anxiety), and in the avoidance of uncertainty (i.e.,
Uncertainty-Avoidance), where more uncertainty avoidance and
more attention to threats were associated with less liberalism
and more conservatism (Jost et al., 2007). Here we use Jost’s
broad “Threat Management” terminology, which encompasses
many different types of threat (i.e., threat to self-esteem, mortality
salience, ideological threat to the system, etc.); we, however,
sought to extend research in this area and to test a specific
type of threat – perceived threat toward one’s group, which is
a fundamental motive within intergroup relations based upon
Intergroup Threat Theory (ITT) (Kurzban et al., 2001; Stephan
et al., 2009, 2015), and which may be included within the broader
threat management classification that Jost uses. We conceptually
replicated some effects from the Uncertainty-Threat Model and
we extended them to the context of immigration and extended
them by using a standard measure of perceived realistic and
symbolic threat based upon ITT (Stephan et al., 1999).
Testing the Uncertainty-Threat Model
The Uncertainty-Threat Model (UTM) may provide theoretical
insights into observed differences between liberals and
conservatives on a variety of issues, including negative
responses to low status groups such as immigrants. In Jost
and colleagues’ original review of political orientation research,
they argued that conservatives’ resistance to change and
resistance to equality is motivated by higher needs to manage
threat and uncertainty (Jost et al., 2003); these needs can
be due to either dispositional motives (e.g., personality), or
a conservative shift in needs could occur from temporarily
activated motives (i.e., priming) that temporarily shifts and
strengthens affiliation with threat and/or uncertainty avoidance.
Jost et al. (2007) provided some of the first evidence to explicitly
test these ideas. In their paper, they observed that uncertainty-
avoidance (e.g., need for order, intolerance of ambiguity, and
lack of openness) and threat management (e.g., death anxiety,
system threat, and/or perceptions of a dangerous world) each
predicted more conservatism. They, however, did not support
the alternative model proposed by the worldview validation
perspective (Greenberg and Jonas, 2003) that predicted that
more uncertainty-avoidance and threat management should
be related to more extreme political ideology, on both the
left and the right (Jost et al., 2007). Thus, there is some
support for the Uncertainty-Threat Model that argues that
“both temporary, situational factors and chronic, dispositional
tendencies pertaining to the avoidance of uncertainty and the
management of threat are therefore hypothesized to affect
ideological preferences” (Jost et al., 2007, p. 990); these chronic
tendencies are proposed to be related to more conservatism and
less liberalism (Jost et al., 2007; Jost, 2017).
While the Uncertainty-Threat model could be insightful, there
is debate about whether and how uncertainty and threat relate
to political ideology and how it might relate to intergroup
relations. Our primary goal in this research was to seek to
explain this political divide. Therefore, we tested the ability
of measured/dispositional uncertainty-avoidance and perceived-
threat to mediate the relationship between political ideology and
attitudes toward immigrants that are highly relevant to current
political debates within a diversifying world; these debates are
likely to continue for decades to come as countries grapple
with the need for immigration and this need is likely to
continue because economic growth is currently tied to increased
efficiency and increased population growth, which will depend
upon immigration because the current US birth rate is below
population replacement levels. In our research, we tested the
hypotheses that more conservatism and less liberalism is related
to more negative attitudes toward immigrants (Hypothesis 1a),
that more conservatism would be related to more dispositional
uncertainty-avoidance and more perceived threat (Hypothesis
1b), and that higher uncertainty-avoidance and perceived threat
would mediate the relationship between political ideology and
attitudes toward immigrants (Hypothesis 1c). At this early stage,
we did not focus on the temporary conservative shift hypothesis
and instead sought to test the chronic dispositional hypothesis.
The finding of liberals showing less avoidance of uncertainty
and less of a focus on threats and conservatives showing more
of each could be increased when encountering intergroup
situations. Research has shown that thinking about or
encountering intergroup situations can increase uncertainty
and perceived threat (Grieve and Hogg, 1999; Stephan et al.,
2009). Thus, in intergroup situations of non-immigrants thinking
about immigrants, a motivation of uncertainty-avoidance and
threat-management should be predictive of responses to
outgroups that are emphasized by the intergroup context (Jost
et al., 2003, 2017). There is, however, little research on threat
and uncertainty together, and less on the relationship between
political ideology, threat, uncertainty, and immigrants together.
Thus, we next examine these separate areas of research.
Some researchers argue that uncertainty can increase
deliberation or compromise in negotiations and reduce
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confidence (Marcus et al., 2000; MacKuen et al., 2010). This
position, would then argue that increased uncertainty should
also lead to less biased responding. Yet, increased uncertainty
has been demonstrated to be related to increased intergroup bias
in both minimal group paradigms and with real-world groups
(Grieve and Hogg, 1999; Federico et al., 2013) and to be related
to increased confidence in one’s attitudes and social identity,
which can lead to more attitude bias (Hogg and Mullin, 1999;
Van den Bos et al., 2005; McGregor, 2006). Thus, more reliance
on avoiding uncertainty could be related to more attitude bias.
Previous research, however, has also demonstrated that
conservatives are more influenced by uncertainty in situations in
which threats have been highlighted (Haas, 2016). In her research,
Haas measured support for compromise on the Affordable Care
Act (i.e., Obamacare), and manipulated uncertainty and threat by
asking participants to imagine either a home invasion scenario
(threat) in which the culprit was either inside the house (certain)
or trying to get in (uncertain). In the low threat control condition,
participants imagined someone arriving at home during the
day and ringing the doorbell; the person was either someone
they knew (certain) or did not know (uncertain; Haas and
Cunningham, 2014). This research observed that conservatives
expressed less support for compromise with liberals, but only
when uncertainty was paired with threat (Haas, 2016). This
research would indicate that conditions that paired threat and
uncertainty may increase bias for conservatives.
In regard to threat, it is clearer that attention to threat can
often lead to a variety of biases at the intergroup level. In Riek
et al. (2006) using 95 samples, perceived threat was shown to
have a large influence on increased negative intergroup bias
(average r = 0.43). Numerous other studies have also indicated
that perceiving more threats are linked with increased intergroup
bias and increased negative attitudes toward immigrants (Zarate
et al., 2004; Pereira et al., 2010; Butz and Yogeeswaran, 2011).
In regard to political orientation, research has demonstrated
that liberals show less acceptance of inequality (Duckitt, 2001;
Jost et al., 2003; Duckitt and Sibley, 2009), have more positive
attitudes toward gays and lesbians, Muslim Americans, and
Arabs (Whitley and Lee, 2000; Cunningham et al., 2004; Webster
et al., 2014), show less outgroup hostility (Kugler et al., 2014),
and have more positive feelings toward non-normative groups
such as gays, lesbians, atheists, and Muslims, who are seen as
deviating from Judeo-Christian values (Luguri et al., 2012). In
addition, Jost et al. (2017), in their extensive meta-analysis,
reviewed 174 tests of the hypothesized connection between
feelings of insecurity and threat and more conservatism or
authoritarianism and they found a positive relationship between
conservatism and more subjective threat (weighted average,
r = 0.26). Reviews have also supported the hypothesis that
conservatives are more likely and liberals less likely to have
a lower tolerance for uncertainty; the review notes that, over
nine studies, there was a moderate to large association between
conservatism and lower tolerance for uncertainty (weighted
average r = −0.33; Jost, 2017). Thus, liberals are likely to
show less negative attitudes toward low-status outgroups such
as immigrants, and responsiveness to threat is likely to increase
these negative attitudes, and potentially explain this relationship.
This evidence and the evidence showing that uncertainty-
avoidance is often related to more negative attitudes and that
conservatives tend to show more uncertainty-avoidance, lead
us to predict that conservatives would show more negative
attitudes toward immigrants than would liberals (Hypothesis
1a). Based upon Jost’s model and because conservatives are
proposed to show more threat-avoidance and more uncertainty-
avoidance, we predicted that both of the dispositional variables of
Perceived Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance would mediate the
relationship to Attitudes toward immigrants (Hypothesis 1c).
A secondary goal of the current research was to test the
Uncertainty-Threat Model against the Extremity Hypothesis.
Several researchers argue that needs to reduce uncertainty and
threat should lead to endorsement of any extreme ideology (i.e.,
extremity hypothesis) regardless of one’s beliefs and political
ideology (McGregor et al., 2001; Greenberg and Jonas, 2003;
Hogg, 2012). Thus, needs to reduce threat and uncertainty
should be higher at both ends of the political range. One
standard way to measure this is to test the linear and
quadratic regression effects between political ideology and
threat and uncertainty-avoidance (Jost and Napier, 2012; van
Prooijen et al., 2015). A quadratic effect would show that as
political ideology became more liberal or more conservative,
the relationship to threat and uncertainty-avoidance would
be stronger (i.e., a u-shaped relationship). A linear only
trend would support the Uncertainty-Threat Mode because
it would show that more conservatism and less liberalism
was related to more threat and uncertainty avoidance in
a linear fashion.
Little research evidence, however, has examined the extremity
hypothesis (i.e., extreme responding on both sides of the
political spectrum), and the research that does exist is somewhat
ambiguous (Jost and Napier, 2012). Jost et al. (2003) found
that 7 of 13 studies in their meta-analysis observed only a
linear relationship between uncertainty and conservatism (i.e.,
support for the uncertainty-threat model), while 6 studies showed
both a linear relationship and a quadratic relationship (i.e.,
support for uncertainty-threat model and for extreme responding
on both ends of the political spectrum). Thus, according to
Jost and Napier (2012), p. 91 “psychological needs to reduce
uncertainty and threat are associated with political conservatism
in particular and not ideological extremity in general.” In
newer research, van Prooijen et al. (2015) have observed that
people on the left and right political extremes showed more
derogation of immigrants and more derogation of societal groups
in general than did political moderates, however, their research
tested attitudes to multiple societal groups simultaneously,
instead of individually, which could have changed participants’
responses compared to having multiple participants rate only
a single group; such question order context effects have been
demonstrated previously in which the order of questions frames
the questions that follow; thus, the order of questions regarding
multiple societal groups could affect the interpretation and
response to those groups (Schwarz et al., 1990; Schuldt et al.,
2015); future research will need to investigate this phenomena
more thoroughly. Regardless, van Prooijen et al., did observe a
small (Cohen et al., 2003) quadratic relationship to derogation
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of immigrants by liberals and conservatives on the extreme
ends of the spectrum (R2 = 0.01), and they showed that there
was a descriptively larger linear relationship in which there
was more derogation by conservatives and less by liberals
(R2 = 0.17). Overall, there is some evidence showing that
people at the political extremes show more extreme responding,
but the research also demonstrates more extreme responses by
conservatives on negative responses to societal groups in general
and toward immigrants.
Jost et al. (2007) and Jost and Napier (2012) have, however,
provided additional evidence of the relationship between
conservatism, and uncertainty and threat reduction. In
their original work, Jost et al. (2007) showed that political
conservatism was related to more uncertainty-avoidance
and more threat, but these factors were not significantly
related to ideological extremism noted in the extremity
hypothesis; this pattern was demonstrated reliably in three
different studies conducted in three different geographic
regions within the US. In our current research, we sought to
replicate these relationships between political ideology and
more threat and more uncertainty-avoidance, and to extend
them to attitudes toward immigrants. In Hypothesis 2a, we
predicted that conservatives would show more perceived
threat and more uncertainty-avoidance than liberals, and that
we would observe a linear relationship only (Uncertainty-
Threat Model) and not a quadratic relationship as suggested
by the worldview validation perspective (Greenberg and
Jonas, 2003; Hogg, 2012). While this prediction is contrary
to Burke and colleagues’ meta-analytic findings (Burke
et al., 2013), Burke’s analysis focused on mortality threats,
which were not measured in our research; we, instead,
focused on perceived threats to one’s ingroup that were
not related to physical death in the measure of Perceived
Threat that we used; this measure is based upon ITT
(Stephan et al., 1999), and while threat of death or physical
harm could have been included in a measure of perceived
realistic and symbolic threat, Stephan and colleagues, to
date, have not included it within their standard measure.
As a result, we continued the use of this standard measure
of perceived realistic and symbolic threat used in ITT by
Stephan and colleagues.
We also predicted that liberals would show less negative
attitudes toward immigrants and conservatives would show more
negative attitudes because existing evidence has demonstrated
this relationship (Luguri et al., 2012; Kugler et al., 2014;
Brooks et al., 2016). Thus, if the extremity hypothesis from
the worldview validation perspective were to be supported, a
chronic tendency toward more threat and uncertainty-avoidance
should be related to participants being more polarized in
their view of immigrants as their chronic tendency to avoid
threat/uncertainty was greater (e.g., very liberal participants
could be more positive and very conservative participants could
be more negative, or both could be more negative). Thus,
the quadratic relationship test could be applied to attitudes
toward immigrants in addition to threat and uncertainty-
avoidance. Given that liberals were predicted to be less negative
and conservatives more negative toward immigrants, we also
predicted that there would be linear relationship between
political ideology and attitudes toward immigrants in which
more conservatism was related to more negative attitudes,
but that the quadratic term would be non-significant (i.e.,
a natural extension of the extremity hypothesis in which
one’s initial preference would be increased or be more
negative; Hypothesis 2b).
A recent review by Crawford (2017), has indicated that
the way threat has been defined within the motivated social
cognition (Jost et al., 2003) and negativity bias (Hibbing)
perspectives is too broad. Crawford argues that threats can be
differentiated into meaning threats and into physical threats.
The meaning threats “include more abstract concerns regarding
the violation of one’s sense of belonging, identity, purpose,
significance, continuity, or certainty” while physical threats
“include more concrete concerns regarding the violation of
one’s physical safety and well-being through the potential of
death or other physical trauma” (Crawford, p. 356). His review
argues that while liberals and conservatives are differentially
influenced by physical threats, they are, similarly, influenced by
meaning threats. Within our current set of studies, we have
not focused on physical threats (i.e., threats of death or bodily
harm); instead, we have used the ITT perspective (Stephan
et al., 2015) that has not differentiated between realistic threats
about competition for resources (e.g., taking jobs) and threats
about physical safety (e.g., experiencing crimes or physical
trauma); the ITT, instead, has focused on concerns for the
ingroup’s existence, resources, quality of life, and values (Rios
et al., 2018). Thus, we have used the standard ITT measure
of perceived threat to one’s group resources and values that,
to date, has not included threats of death, physical trauma,
or experiencing crimes, at either the concrete level or at the
conceptual level (Stephan et al., 1999, 2009). Theoretically, a
measure of perceived realistic and symbolic threat could tap into
the concrete concerns for physical threat, and future research
could test other measures that incorporate this type of threat.
Overall, the current research used a concept of threat that is
more closely tied to meaning threats and also not in the realm
of mortality salience; this research, however, is limited by using
a pre-existing measure that did not set out to differentiate these
types of threat.
Research Overview
We sought to explain the divide between liberals and
conservatives and sought to extend the Uncertainty-Threat
model to intergroup relations regarding immigrants and in
relation to perceived threats highlighted in the ITT. Given
that liberals tend to show less negative attitudes toward
low status and non-normative groups, we hypothesized
that liberals would show less negative attitudes toward
immigrants and conservatives would show more negative
attitudes toward them. We next tested whether this relationship
would be significantly mediated by both uncertainty-
avoidance and perceived threat, and whether these factors
were equally influential. In follow-up studies, we extended
perceived threat from immigrants to include perceived
threats from unspecified outgroups, and added a measure
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of negative attitudes and an implicit measure of attitudes
toward immigrants.
STUDY 1
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1a: Conservatives would express more negative
attitudes toward immigrants than would liberals. We also,
tentatively, predicted that liberalism would be related to
higher rates of helping immigrants, though given the
placement of this variable at the very end of the study, this
hypothesis is exploratory.
Hypothesis 1b: More conservatism would be related to more
Uncertainty-Avoidance and more Perceived-Threat.
Hypothesis 1c: Both dispositional factors of Perceived-Threat
and Uncertainty-Avoidance would mediate the relationship of
Political Ideology to Attitudes.
Hypothesis 2a: Conservatism would have a positive
linear relationship with Uncertainty-Avoidance and
Perceived-Threat, but the quadratic relationship would
be non-significant.
Hypothesis 2b: Conservatism would have a linear relationship
with Negative Attitudes, but the quadratic relationship would
be non-significant.
Methods
Participants
Two hundred and six participants from the United States
were recruited from the online platform Prolific.ac and they
completed the online study for monetary compensation. Within
the Prolific.ac platform, we recruited only participants who
indicated that their nationality was US and that they were
residing in the US; thus, no participant was an immigrant.
Participants were between 18 and 65 years old (M = 31.00,
SD = 11.35) with 77.2% White, 25.7% Conservative, and 64.1%
male participants. We recruited roughly 200 participants in order
to have.8 power for 2 predictors in the model with a nearly
medium effect size (d = 0.46), which is based upon effect sizes
observed for the smallest factor in previous research (Jost et al.,
2007; Jost and Napier, 2012). See Supplementary Materials for
Supplementary Data Sheet 1 (i.e., Data Dictionary for Study 1)
and Supplementary Data Sheet 2 (i.e., Data File for Study 1).
Materials
Filler task 1
The first filler task was composed of four items from the Need
for Cognition scale (Cacioppo and Petty, 1984) that were not
related to political ideology (α = 0.75, “Need for Cogition4”
to Political Ideology, r = −0.007). Examples of the items
included: “I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned
them” and “I find satisfaction in deliberating hard for many
hours.” The items were answered on a 1–5 response scale from
Extremely Uncharacteristic to Extremely Characteristic, and after
reverse scoring two items, higher scores indicated more Need
for Cognition.
Perceived threat from immigrants
This standard scale from ITT (Stephan et al., 1999, 2015)
consisted of fifteen items that measured threat levels based on
seven symbolic threat and eight realistic threat items that were
presented in a randomized order. The scale used a seven-point,
vertical scale from (1) Disagree Strongly to (7) Agree Strongly.
An example of the items included: “The values and beliefs of
immigrants regarding social relations are not compatible with
the beliefs and values of most Americans.” Because the subscales
share a common theme of threats to the ingroup (Stephan
et al., 1999) and were highly correlated (r = 0.75, p < 0.001,
α = 0.94), we used all fifteen items in the index of perceived
threat, which has been used in previous research (Tausch et al.,
2007; Verkuyten, 2009; Tip et al., 2012; Schmid and Muldoon,
2015; Stephan et al., 2015). After reverse-scoring 8 items, scores
were averaged and higher scores indicated more perceived threat
(M = 3.40, SD = 1.24, α = 0.94).
Uncertainty-avoidance
We used Jost et al. (2007) Uncertainty-Avoidance measure. This
measure was the mean of items from the 10 item Openness to
Experience subscale of the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John et al.,
2008, e.g., “I am someone who is original, and comes up with
new ideas”) and from the same 4 item Intolerance for Ambiguity
measure used by Jost (Budner, 1962, e.g., “People who insist
upon a yes or no answer just don’t know how complicated things
really are”). Both scales were rated from (1) Disagree strongly
to (7) Agree strongly and the items were randomized within
scales; after reverse scoring two items, scores were averaged and
higher scores represented more uncertainty-avoidance (M = 3.10,
SD = 0.83, α = 0.81).
Filler task 2
The second filler task was placed between the mediators and
the outcome measure, and was composed of four additional
items from the Need for Cognition scale (α = 0.86, “Need for
Cogition2nd4” to Political Ideology, r = 0.047). Examples of the
items included “I would prefer complex to simple problems,” and
“I only think as hard as I have to.” After reverse scoring two
items, scores were averaged and higher scores indicated more
Need for Cognition.
Attitudes scale
a five-item Feeling Thermometer (Alwin, 1992; Saguy et al.,
2009) was used as the Attitude measure. Participants rated
their feelings toward immigrants on five opposite pairs of
evaluative dimensions (Warm-Cold, Negative-Positive, Friendly-
Unfriendly, Suspicious-Trustworthy, Admiration-Disgust) using
a nine-point, vertical scale (e.g., the top, 1 = _______ to
9 = _______). After reverse-scoring two items, higher scores
indicated more negative attitudes (M = 4.03, SD = 1.55, α = 0.95).
A separate measure that was not incorporated into the attitude
measure above was completed as a pilot test for future items
for Study 2. Participants completed some pilot questions toward
immigrants (Approval, Acceptance, Liking, Disdain, Hatred;
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adapted from Stephan et al., 2002) by rating “. . . the degree to
which you feel _____ toward immigrants” from (0) No liking at
all (9) Extreme liking, depending upon the adjective rated.
Secondary measures
See Supplementary Table 1 in Supplementary Materials for
descriptions and analyses of these measures. The measures
included the SDO scale, the Death Avoidance scale, the Fear of
Death scale, and a System Threat item.
Additional questions on three separate pages
“In order to demonstrate that you are a real person, please
complete some of these mathematics problems: 6 × 7 = ___; 8
+ 5 = _____.” “Would you be willing to help out immigrants,
who are living in poverty, by providing your email address to be
contacted about helping out? __No, __Yes.” (No email address
was collected). “In the US, left-wing ideas are often but not
exclusively supported by the Democratic Party, and right-wing
ideas are often but not exclusively supported by the Republican
Party. We are interested in where you see yourself in the political
spectrum from 1 = Very Right, to 5 = Neither, to 7 = Very Left”
(M = 4.60, SD = 1.81).
Design
Political orientation was a measured predictor variable, while
Perceived Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance were mediator
variables, and Attitudes toward Immigrants was the outcome
variable. The two mediators of Perceived Threat (Stephan
et al., 1999) and Uncertainty-Avoidance (Jost et al., 2007)
were counterbalanced in order to methodologically control for
order effects. The continuous, Political Orientation measure
was followed by Perceived Threat and then Uncertainty-
Avoidance in orders one (U-A: openness then ambiguity) and
two (U-A: ambiguity then openness), or it was followed by
Uncertainty-Avoidance and then Perceived Threat in orders
three (U-A: openness then ambiguity) and four (U-A: ambiguity
then openness). Participants were randomly assigned to one of
these four, counterbalanced orders (see Supplementary Table 1
in Supplementary Materials for these four orders).
Procedure
Participants completed informed consent and then some
demographic variables including gender, ethnicity, age, English
as a second language, residence status, and political ideology.
Participants rated their personal political orientation on a nine-
point, vertical scale from (1) extremely conservative to (9)
extremely liberal, with moderate as the mid-point (5) as was used
in Jost et al., 2007. The political orientation item has often been
included within demographics in previous research (Fitzgerald
and Wickwire, 2012; Feinberg and Willer, 2013; Crawford et al.,
2015; Janoff-Bulman and Carnes, 2016). The mean political
orientation score was 5.65 (SD = 2.17).
Next, participants completed Filler Task 1 that included four
filler questions from the Need for Cognition scale that were
uncorrelated with political ideology (r = 0.007), and that provided
a small separation from the next task. Participants were then
randomly assigned to one of two orders of the mediators by
being told to select the letter that appeared at the top of a list of
letters. (Each list was randomly ordered for each participant; thus,
participants were not self-selecting into an order. Whichever
letter was chosen had been randomly ordered by the computer
and participants did not know what each letter represented.
Moreover, participants believed they were doing this to check that
the system was recording their responses correctly). Participants
then completed either the Perceived Threat scale first and then
the Uncertainty-Avoidance scale, or they completed the opposite
order. After completing these mediators, participants completed
Filler Task 2 (four filler items from the Need for Cognition scale).
Participants next completed the five-item Feeling
Thermometer (Alwin, 1992; Saguy et al., 2009) as the Attitude
measure (M = 4.03, SD = 1.55, α = 0.95). They then completed
five additional attitude items that were being pilot tested
for a later study.
To further test some relationships suggested by the
Uncertainty-Threat Model, we included some secondary
measures of death avoidance, fear of death, and system threat
that had been used by Jost et al. (2007). Participants first
completed a Death Avoidance scale (5 items, α = 0.92, M = 3.73,
SD = 1.68) and Fear of Death scale (M = 3.91, SD = 1.58, α = 0.91;
Wong et al., 1994) to test the proposed positive relationship to
conservatism. Participants also completed a single item of system
threat (Jost et al., 2007) and then the SDO scale with sixteen
items (M = 2.58, SD = 1.25, α = 0.95, Pratto et al., 1994) to test
the positive relationships between political ideology and system
threat, and between political ideology and social dominance.
Next, participants completed some simple mathematics, filler
questions and then a secondary, behavioral measure of helping
that was being pilot tested. They answered a yes/no question
about whether they would be willing to help immigrants, who
are living in poverty, by providing their email address in order to
be contacted about helping out; no email addresses were actually
collected. Finally, participants completed questions about a
left-right political orientation item and then questions about the
purpose and how positive their day was, and then were debriefed.
The purpose and positive day questions were filler questions.
Results
Prior to testing the main hypotheses, we coded the four orders of
the mediators and conducted a regression with Order, Political
Orientation, and the interaction in the model for each outcome
measure. We observed non-significant Order × Political
interactions for Attitudes toward Immigrants and for Attitude
Bias2 (pilot-tested items); for all analyses, we observed p > 0.146
and R2 < 0.011. A Linear regression was conducted next to
investigate the hypothesis that Political Orientation would be
associated with Attitudes toward immigrants. Higher scores
reflected a more liberal political ideology. As hypothesized,
Political Orientation was significantly and negatively related to
negative Attitudes, R2 = 0.27, β = −0.52, t = -8.64, p < 0.001,
with bootstrapped b = −0.37, 95%BCa CI [−0.45, −0.29],
p < 0.001, which indicated that, within a narrow confidence
interval, higher liberalism was associated with less negative
Attitudes (Hypothesis 1a); all Confidence Intervals (CI) used
Bias Corrected intervals (BCa CI) as recommended by Hayes
(2013) regardless of whether they were called “BCa CI” or “CI”.
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Political Orientation was also significantly and negatively related
to the second Attitude measure being pilot tested, R2 = 0.27,
β = −0.51, t = -8.57, p < 0.001, with bootstrapped b = −0.42,
95%BCa CI [−0.51,−0.32], p < 0.001.
To test the extremity hypotheses, we centered Political
Orientation and computed the quadratic term using the mean-
centered variable based upon recommendations for quadratic
regressions (Cohen et al., 2003; van Prooijen et al., 2015).
We added the Political Orientation variable in Step 1 and
the Quadratic variable in Step 2 of the regression model with
Uncertainty-Avoidance and we observed a Quadratic R2 < 0.001,
β = −0.01, t = −0.13, p = 0.894 with bootstrapped b < −0.01,
95%BCa CI [−0.02, 0.02]. This same analysis was performed for
Perceived Threat and found a Quadratic R2 < 0.001, β = −0.03,
t =−0.48, p = 0.631, bootstrapped b<−0.01, 95%BCa CI [−0.03,
0.02]. Both non-significant effects suggested that participants at
the extreme ends of political ideology did not endorse threat
or uncertainty-avoidance significantly more (Hypotheses 2a),
which replicates the non-significant, quadratic effects observed
by Jost et al. (2003, 2007). We also performed these analyses
for the relationship between Political Ideology and Attitudes
toward immigrants. The Quadratic term was non-significant,
R2 < 0.001, β = −0.013, t = −0.20, p = 0.839 with bootstrapped
b <−0.01, 95%BCa CI [−0.04, 0.03], suggesting that participants
at either extreme end of the political spectrum were not
responding with more negative attitudes toward immigrants
(Hypothesis 2b). Finally, a binary logistic regression analysis
was conducted to test whether Political Orientation would
be positively associated with the binary, behavioral-variable of
Helping Immigrants who are living in poverty. We observed
that more liberalism was significantly related to more Helping of
immigrants (Hypothesis 1a), β = 0.28, SE = 0.08, Wald = 10.97,
p = 0.001, Odds Ratio = 1.32, 95%BCa CI [1.12, 1.55], Cox and
Snell R2 = 0.06.
Mediation
We next tested the multiple-mediational hypothesis in which
Perceived Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance (r = 0.218) were
proposed to significantly mediate the Political Orientation to
Attitudes toward Immigrants relationship. We performed a
simultaneous, multiple-mediation test using PROCESS analysis
in SPSS with bias corrected confidence intervals to 5000 samples
as recommended for multiple mediators by Hayes (2013). As
hypothesized, both Perceived Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance
significantly mediated the Political Orientation to Attitudes
relationship (see Figure 1; Hypothesis 1c). In evaluating the
mediators, Threat was significantly larger with a comparison
b = −0.29, CI [−0.38, −21] (see Supplementary Table 1 in
Supplementary Materials for mediations using the Symbolic
Threat subscale that replicate the effects observed with the
entire Symbolic and Realistic Perceived Threat scale). We next
tested the mediations for the relationship of Political Orientation
to Pilot-tested Attitudes and observed that both Uncertainty-
Avoidance (b = −0.02, CI [−0.05, −0.01], CSIE = −0.03)
and Threat (b = −0.38, CI [−0.48, −0.29], CSIE = −0.47)
were significant mediators. The mediational analyses for
Behavioral Helping were also supportive of the model, but
only for the Threat variable (see Supplementary Table 1 in
Supplementary Materials).
Both mediators were also significant when entered into
separate mediations (Uncertainty-Avoidance, b = −0.03, CI
[−0.07, −0.01], R2 = 0.06, CSIE = −0.05, and Threat, b = −0.33,
CI [−0.42,−0.26], R2 = 0.27, CSIE =−0.46). In addition, the Left-
Right measure of Political Orientation produced the same pattern
of results and levels of significance for all analyses. For both
political variables, all patterns of results and levels of significance
remained the same for all analyses in a sample of 181 participants
after removing participants who failed to indicate that they were
born in the United States in the second set of demographics
questions in Study 1. Even though all 206 participants indicated
that their Nationality was US in the prolific.ac screening criteria,
some had failed to verify this in our demographic questions; we
improved these questions in later studies.
Discussion
Political Orientation was significantly and linearly associated
with Perceived Threat and Uncertainty-Avoidance, but the
quadratic effect, which tested the extremity hypothesis, was not
significant; this pattern replicated the non-significant quadratic
effects of Jost et al. (2003, 2007). In an extension of these
predictions, the quadratic effect was also non-significant for
the Political Orientation to Attitudes toward immigrants, which
again shows a lack of support for the extremity hypothesis
based upon the worldview validation perspective (Greenberg
and Jonas, 2003; Hogg, 2012). Moreover, we observed that both
Uncertainty-Avoidance and Perceived Threat were significant
mediators in a multiple-mediation model of Political Orientation
to Attitudes, and Perceived Threat was a significantly more
influential mediator; these mediations were replicated with the
Symbolic Threat subscale. Thus, the current research found
support for the Uncertainty-Threat Model, and it extended
this model to intergroup relations regarding immigrants and to
Stephan et al.’s (1999) perceived threat scale.
STUDY 2
Study 2 aimed to extend the measure of threat to unspecified
outgroups and to test whether uncertainty-avoidance and
perceived threat from unspecified outgroups, as opposed
to immigrants, mediated the relationship between political
orientation and attitudes toward immigrants. We adapted a
perceived threat to specific groups scale (Stephan et al., 2002)
to be about unspecified outgroups in much the same way that
the SDO measure is about hierarchy in relation to unspecified
groups. A second aim was to extend the measurement of attitudes
to include only negative ratings in order to demonstrate that
the effects occur on only negative attitudes and that they did
not occur solely due to liberals responding more positively and
conservatives responding on the neutral mid-point in Study
1. We hypothesized that political orientation would again be
significantly and negatively correlated with attitudes and also
with the new, negative attitude measure in addition to the
helping immigrants variable. Second, we hypothesized that both
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FIGURE 1 | Simultaneous, multiple mediation of political orientation to attitudes toward immigrants with perceived threat and uncertainty-avoidance as mediators.
Brackets represent 95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test.
uncertainty-avoidance and the perceived threat from unspecified
outgroups would mediate the negative relationships between
political ideology and attitudes toward immigrants, and between
political ideology and negative attitudes, and in a replication of
Study 1, threat would be a more influential mediator. Finally,
we anticipated replicating the non-significant quadratic effects
on the relationships between political ideology and the mediators
and between political ideology and both measures of attitudes.
Methods
Participants
A sample of three hundred and eight participants was recruited
from Prolific.ac. All participants indicated within the Prolific.ac
platform that they were born in the US and currently resided in
the US; thus, no participant was considered an immigrant. They
were between 18 and 74 years old (M = 31.53, SD = 12.12) with
80.5% White, 22.1% Conservative, and 50.6% male participants.
We recruited roughly 300 participants in order to have 0.85
power for 2 predictors and 0.82 with 3 predictors in the
model with a small effect size (d = 0.39) based upon Study
1 results estimated from the multiple-mediation model. See
Supplementary Materials for Supplementary Data Sheet 3 (i.e.,
Data Dictionary for Study 2) and Supplementary Data Sheet 4
(i.e., Data File for Study 2).
Design
The order of the measures and mediators was the same as
in Study 1 with a few changes. The deviations from Study 1
included the following: (1) The ambiguity items and openness
items were randomized within a single, Uncertainty-Avoidance
questionnaire instead of within separate questionnaires, (2) Study
2 used only two orders because Uncertainty-Avoidance was
now a single scale; thus, the Perceived Threat and Uncertainty-
Avoidance mediators were again counterbalanced to control for
order effects, (3) The Perceived Threat measure was changed
from “threat from immigrants” to “threat from unspecified
outgroups” using an adaptation of Stephan et al.’s (2002)
measure with 24 items (see Supplementary Materials), and
the single-item system threat question was included at the end
of the perceived threat measure, (4) The death avoidance and
threat from death scales were removed because of non-significant
findings in Study 1, (5) an attitude scale with only negative
adjectives was added after the first attitude scale from Study 1 in
order to tap only negativity, and finally (6) seven filler items were
added before the helping immigrants question. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of the two, counterbalanced orders
of the mediators.
New Materials
Perceived threat from unspecified outgroups
We used the 24-item Perceived Threat measure that we changed
to be about (unspecified) outgroups by adapting Stephan et al.’s
(2002) threat from ethnic minority groups measure. Within the
instructions, participants were provided with this definition for
outgroups: “In this section of the study, we will ask you to
think about “OUTGROUPS.” For the purposes of this study, an
Outgroup is any group or groups of which you DO NOT class
yourself as being a member of, or belonging to, and that you do
not identify with” (see Supplementary Table 1 in Supplementary
Materials for the full measure). There were 12 symbolic threat
items (e.g., “My group has very different values than outgroups.”)
and 12 realistic threat items (e.g., Too much money is spent on
educational programs that benefit outgroups). The measure used
a seven-point, vertical scale from (1) Disagree Strongly to (7)
Agree Strongly. After reverse scoring, we averaged the items and
a higher score indicated more perceived threat from unspecified
outgroups (α = 0.96).
Negative attitude scale
This scale included rating five negative feelings toward
immigrants (Disapproval, Resentment, Dislike, Disdain,
Hatred; adapted from Stephan et al., 2002). Participants
were asked to “Please indicate the degree to which you feel
_________ toward immigrants” on a nine-point, vertical scale
from (0) No _________ to (9) Extreme _________. Higher
scores represented more negative attitudes toward immigrants
(M = 2.49, SD = 1.99, α = 0.95).
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Filler task 3
A third filler task was placed between the attitude outcome
measures and the final questions about mathematics, helping
immigrants, and making errors within the study. It was composed
of seven items from the Need for Cognition scale (α = 0.82).
Procedure
Following the rating of political orientation within the
demographic questions, participants completed the same
Need for Cognition Filler Task 1 as in Study 1 (α = 0.75).
They then were randomly assigned to complete either the
Perceived Threat from Unspecified Outgroups (24 items,
α = 0.96, r = 0.87, M = 3.67, SD = 1.31) scale first and then the
Uncertainty-Avoidance scale (M = 2.95, SD = 0.80, α = 0.81), or
they completed the opposite order as was done in Study 1. Next,
participants completed the same need for cognition Filler Task 2
as from Study 1 (α = 0.81).
Participants then completed the first Attitudes scale, which
was the same as in Study 1 and included participants rating their
feelings toward immigrants on five opposite pairs of evaluative
dimensions (M = 3.87, SD = 1.66, α = 0.94). They then completed
the Negative Attitude scale, which included rating five negative
feelings toward immigrants (Disapproval, Resentment, Dislike,
Disdain, Hatred (M = 2.49, SD = 1.99, α = 0.95). Participants
next completed the SDO scale used in Study 1 (M = 2.36,
SD = 1.18, α = 0.95). After completing Filler Task 3 (7 items from
Need for Cognition scale; α = 0.82) and two mathematics items,
participants completed the same yes/no helping-immigrants
behavioral measure from Study 1, and then were debriefed.
Results
We coded the two orders of the mediators and conducted a
regression with Order, Political Orientation, and the interaction
in the model for each outcome measure. We found non-
significant Order x Political interactions for the Attitudes
measure and the Negative Attitude measure; all interaction
p > 0.713 and R2 < 0.001. Two linear regressions were
performed to test the expected negative relationships between
Political Orientation and Attitudes toward Immigrants and
between Political Orientation and Negative Attitudes toward
Immigrants. As expected, Political Orientation was significantly
and negatively related to more negative Attitudes (Hypothesis
1a), R2 = 0.29, β = −0.54, t = −11.09, p < 0.001, with
bootstrapped b = −0.43, 95%BCa CI [−0.51, −0.35], p < 0.001,
and it also was significantly and negatively related to more
negativity on the Negative Attitude measure (Hypothesis 1a),
R2 = 0.19, β = −0.43, t = -8.38, p < 0.001, with bootstrapped
b = −0.41, 95%BCa CI [−0.52, −0.31], p < 0.001; Because
higher scores on Political Orientation were related to a more
liberal ideology, the results indicated that higher liberalism was
associated with less negative attitudes. Moreover, we created an
Averaged Attitude score for Attitudes and Negative Attitudes
and then standardized it; Political Orientation was significantly
and negatively related to this standardized-Averaged Attitude
score, R2 = 0.27, β = −0.51, t = −10.50, p < 0.001 (see the
Supplementary Table 1 in Supplementary Materials for analyses
with the SDO variable).
For the extremity analyses, the Quadratic term entered
in Step 2 of the regression was non-significant for the
relationships between Political Orientation and Uncertainty-
Avoidance, R2 = 0.009, β = −0.10, t = −1.72, p = 0.09,
bootstrapped b = −0.02, 95%BCa CI [−0.04, 0.01] and between
Political Orientation and Threat from Unspecified Outgroups,
R2 < 0.001, β = −0.03, t = −0.46, p = 0.643, bootstrapped
b =−0.01, 95%BCa CI [−0.04, 0.03] (Hypothesis 2a). In separate
regressions, the Quadratic term was also non-significant for
the Political Orientation to Attitudes relationship, R2 = 0.002,
β =−0.05, t =−0.98, p = 0.327, bootstrapped b =−0.02, 95%BCa
CI [−0.05, 0.02] and also for the Negative Attitudes variable
as predicted (Hypothesis 2b), R2 < 0.001, β = 0.01, t = 0.10,
p = 0.923, bootstrapped b < 0.01, 95%BCa CI [−0.05, 0.05].
Next, a binary logistic regression was conducted to test the binary,
behavioral-variable of Helping Immigrants who are living in
poverty. We again observed that more liberalism was significantly
related to more Helping of immigrants (Hypothesis 1a), β = 0.20,
SE = 0.07, Wald = 9.16, p = 0.002, Odds Ratio = 1.22, 95%BCa CI
[1.07, 1.40], Cox and Snell R2 = 0.03.
Mediations
To examine the multiple-mediation hypothesis for Perceived
Threat from Outgroups and Uncertainty-Avoidance (r = 0.157),
we conducted separate, multiple-mediation analyses for Attitudes
and for Negative Attitudes toward Immigrants using PROCESS.
As predicted, both Uncertainty-Avoidance and Perceived Threat
from Outgroups had significant indirect effects on the Political
Orientation to Attitudes relationship (see Figure 2; Hypothesis
1c), and Threat was larger, comparison b = −0.07, CI
[−0.14, −0.01]. Both Uncertainty-Avoidance and Threat from
Unspecified Outgroups also had significant indirect effects on
the Political Orientation to Negative Attitudes relationship (see
Figure 3; Hypothesis 1c), and Threat was larger, comparison
b = −0.11, CI [−0.19, −0.04]. Once again, we tested these two
mediations with the Symbolic Threat subscale and replicated
the same pattern of results as with the full Perceived Threat
scale (see Supplementary Table 1 in Supplementary Materials
for full results with Symbolic Threat). The mediational analyses
for Behavioral Helping were, however, not supportive (see
Supplementary Table 1 in Supplementary Materials for a
discussion of issues with placement and reliability).
Confirming the results of Study 1, both mediators were
significant when entered into separate mediations for the Political
Orientation to Attitudes relationship (Uncertainty-Avoidance,
b = −0.05, CI [−0.08, −0.02], R2 = 0.08, CSIE = −0.06,
and Perceived Threat from Unspecified Outgroups, b = −0.12,
CI [−0.19, −0.07], R2 = 0.17, CSIE = −0.15]). The separate
mediations were also significant for the Political to Negative
Attitudes relationship with Uncertainty-Avoidance b =−0.05, CI
[−0.10, −0.02], R2 = 0.05, CSIE = −0.05, and Perceived Threat
from Unspecified Outgroups b = −0.15, CI [−0.24, −0.10],
R2 = 0.13, CSIE =−0.16.
The Left-Right measure of Political Orientation produced
the same pattern of results and levels of significance for all
analyses with the exception that the quadratic effect on just the
Attitudes measure was now significant; however, this effect was
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FIGURE 2 | Simultaneous, multiple mediation of political orientation to attitudes toward immigrants with perceived threat from unspecified outgroups and
uncertainty-avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test.
 
  Political 
 
Threat from 
Outgroups b = -.29, p < .001 
 
Negative 
Attitudes  
 
  
Uncertainty-
Avoidance 
b = -.11, p < .001 
b = .52, p < .001 
b = .41, p < .001 
Indirect, b = -.15, CI [-.23, -.10], CSIE = -.16 
Indirect, b = -.04, CI [-.09, -.01], CSIE = -.05 
FIGURE 3 | Simultaneous, multiple mediation of political orientation to negative attitudes toward immigrants with perceived threat from unspecified outgroups and
uncertainty-avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test.
small, R2 = 0.01, β = −0.21, t = −2.11, p = 0.036. In addition,
for both political variables, all patterns of results and levels
of significance remained the same for all analyses in a sample
of 301 participants after removing participants who failed to
indicate that they were born in the United States in the second
set of demographic questions in Study 2. Even though all 308
participants indicated that they were born in the United States
in the prolific.ac screening criteria, some had failed to verify this
within the Study 2 demographic questions.
Discussion
In Study 2, we extended the measurement of attitudes to a
measure examining only negative responses and also extended
the perceived threat from immigrants measure to perceived threat
from (unspecified) outgroups in a manner similar to the way SDO
is measured in relation to (unspecified) groups. We replicated
the political orientation to attitudes results and the multiple-
mediations with uncertainty-avoidance and threat that had been
observed in Study 1; in this case, we used a more general threat
from outgroups instead of threat from immigrants in order to
remove common target bias. We also demonstrated the same
pattern of results for the Negative Attitudes measure and the
Attitudes measure. Overall, the observed results significantly
extend the Uncertainty-Threat Model and its implications for
examining intergroup relationships, especially for low status or
disadvantaged groups such as immigrants.
STUDY 3
In Study 3, we replaced the behavioral dependent variable with a
validated, implicit measure of attitudes, the Affect Misattribution
Procedure (AMP; Payne et al., 2005); we did not measure both
variables because of time constraints. In addition, we returned
to the use of the perceived threat from immigrants measure as a
mediator in Study 3 in order to test whether it would mediate the
results to the negative attitudes measure used in Study 2 but not in
Study 1; We also tested whether perceived threat would mediate
the relationship to the validated, implicit measure.
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Methods
Participants
A sample of three hundred and thirty-one participants was
recruited from the Prolific.ac to complete the online study with
the anticipation that we would have to remove participants
for non-completion and inattention. We followed the standard
procedure for removing participants who failed to follow
instructions and who responded on the implicit bias measure
with one key response on ninety-eight percent or more of all
test trials (Payne and Lundberg, 2014); we had a final sample of
312 participants. All participants indicated within the Prolific.ac
platform that they were born in the US and currently resided
in the US; thus, no participant was an immigrant. They were
between 18 and 75 years old (M = 31.71, SD = 12.39) with 68.6%
White, 20.8% Conservative, and 54.2% male participants. We
recruited roughly 300 participants in order to have 0.8 power for
2 predictors in the model with a small effect size (d = 0.38) based
upon previous online completion rates for our studies and based
upon the results of Studies 1 and 2. See Supplementary Materials
for Supplementary Data Sheet 5 (i.e., Data Dictionary for Study
3) and Supplementary Data Sheet 6 (i.e., Data File for Study 3).
Materials
Participants completed an online version of the Affect
Misattribution Procedure (AMP) as an indirect measure of
attitude bias toward immigrants (Payne et al., 2005, 2008, 2010;
Imhoff and Banse, 2009; Payne and Lundberg, 2014). In the AMP
implicit attitude bias measure, participants saw a photograph
of an Immigrant face (Pakistani/Indian face), a Non-Immigrant
face (White), or a gray square for an equal number of trials; the
prime faces were matched for attractiveness. Each prime photo
was replaced quickly with a Korean pictograph of a non-word,
letter string; we used non-words so that ability to read Korean did
not affect the outcome of the task. We used the same timing as
previous online AMP research (Payne et al., 2010) in which there
were 72 trials where participants saw a Dot for 500 ms to identify
the beginning of a trial and this dot was followed by a prime
(face or gray square) for 75 ms, then followed by a pictograph
for 225 ms. A television-static pattern mask then appeared and
remained on the screen until participants responded by pressing
either the key labeled Pleasant or the key labeled Unpleasant.
Participants were instructed to ignore the faces of immigrants
and non-immigrants and to judge only whether the pictograph
drawing appeared to be more or less pleasant than average; they
had four practice trials to familiarize themselves with the task
prior to completing the 72 critical trials. Thirty-six pictograph,
non-words were presented twice within 2 blocks of 36 trials,
and the 12 immigrant faces, 12 white faces, and 12 gray squares
were presented twice each (i.e., once in each block of 36 trials
for a total of 72 trials). Each prime was randomly paired with
pictographs within each block of 36 trials. We used the standard
scoring procedure from past research by taking the percentage
of pleasant responses after White faces and subtracting the
percentage of pleasant responses after Immigrant faces; thus,
scores can range from 1 to −1 and higher scores indicated
more positive attitudes toward White faces in comparison to
Immigrant faces (AMP; Payne et al., 2005, 2010).
Design
Study 3 used the same materials and procedures as Study 2 with
the following changes: (1) In the current study, we returned to
the use of the Perceived Threat from Immigrants scale (Stephan
et al., 1999) that we had used in Study 1, and (2) In Study 3,
we counterbalanced the order of Perceived Threat, Uncertainty-
Avoidance, and SDO. The attitude dependent variables were
also counterbalanced so that explicit measures and the implicit
measure each occurred first for half of the participants in order
to control for order effects (see Supplementary Table 1 in
Supplementary Materials for the order of measures), (3) we
dropped the measure of system threat and the behavioral helping
measure, and added the measure of Implicit Attitudes (see
Materials for procedural details).
Procedure
After completing the demographic questions and the rating of
political ideology, participants completed the same Filler Task
1 (four items from the Need for Cognition scale, α = 0.61)
used in Studies 1 and 2. Next, participants were randomly
assigned to order by being asked to choose the letter that
appeared at the top of a list of letters (each randomly
ordered for each participant and participants were unaware
of the meaning of the letters; see Supplementary Table 1 in
Supplementary Materials for orders). For Study 3, Perceived
Threat, Uncertainty-Avoidance, and SDO were counterbalanced
to control for order effects. After these mediators, participants
completed the same Filler Task 2 (α = 0.74) used in Studies
1 and 2, and then completed the attitude dependent variables
(Explicit Attitudes, Explicit Negative Attitudes, and Implicit
Attitudes), which were counterbalanced so that explicit measures
and the implicit measure each occurred first for half of the
participants in order to control for order effects. Attitudes
toward immigrants, Perceived Threat from Immigrants, and
Uncertainty-Avoidance were measured with the same scales used
in Study 1 and all three showed good reliability (Attitudes,
M = 3.60, SD = 1.40, α = 0.91; Threat, M = 3.00, SD = 1.16,
α = 0.92; Uncertainty-Avoidance, M = 2.93, SD = 0.74, α = 0.77)
with higher average scores equaling more negative attitudes or
more perceived threat. Implicit Attitudes (M = 0.00, SD = 0.25)
were measured with the standard AMP, and Explicit Negative
Attitudes (M = 2.34, SD = 1.68, α = 0.95) were again measured
with the same scale used in Study 2. After completing Filler
Task 3 (α = 0.64) and two mathematics items, participants were
thanked and debriefed.
Results
We coded the orders of the mediators to categorize Threat
first, Uncertainty-Avoidance first, and SDO first orders. We then
conducted a regression with Order, Political Orientation, and
the interaction in the model for each outcome measure. We
observed non-significant Order x Political interactions for each
outcome (for the Attitudes toward Immigrants measure, all p-
values > 0.227 and all R2 < 0.005; for the Negative Attitude
measure, all p > 0.230 and all R2 < 0.001; for the Implicit
Attitude measure, all p > 0.060 and all R2 < 0.012). We next
conducted three linear regressions to test the expected negative
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associations between Political Orientation and Explicit Attitudes,
Political Orientation and Explicit Negative Attitudes, and
Political Orientation and Implicit Attitudes toward Immigrants.
Higher scores on Political Orientation indicated a more liberal
ideology. As hypothesized, Political Orientation was significantly
and negatively related to Explicit Attitudes (Hypothesis 1a),
R2 = 0.23, β = −0.48, t =−9.58, p < 0.001, with bootstrapped
b = −0.33, 95%BCa CI [−0.41, −0.25], p < 0.001, significantly
and negatively related to Explicit Negative Attitudes (Hypothesis
1a), R2 = 0.24, β =−0.49, t =−9.99, p < 0.001, with bootstrapped
b = −0.40, 95%BCa CI [−0.50, −0.30], p < 0.001, and it
also was a significant, negative predictor of Implicit Attitudes
(Hypothesis 1a), R2 = 0.12, β = −0.35, t =−6.48, p < 0.001, with
bootstrapped b = −0.04, 95%BCa CI [−0.06, −0.03], p < 0.001.
We standardized the three dependent variables and averaged
them to create a standardized-Averaged Attitude Score. Political
Orientation was a significant, negative predictor of standardized-
Averaged Attitudes, R2 = 0.32, β = −0.57, t = −12.12, p < 0.001,
with bootstrapped b = −0.21, 95%BCa CI [−0.26, −0.17],
p < 0.001. It is also of note that participants showed significantly
more negative attitudes on the explicit measures (i.e., Attitudes
and Negative Attitudes toward Immigrants) than they did on the
implicit measure; for example, the change in R2 was significant
when adding Explicit Attitudes to a model predicting Political
Orientation from Implicit Attitude Bias, R2 Change = 0.283, F(1,
309) = 60.89, p < 0.001. This result is unusual in research on
attitudes because social desirability pressures usually encourage
people to respond more positively on explicit measures for
sensitive topics, while they are less able to alter their responses
on the implicit measures; thus, participants usually show less bias
on explicit measures.
For the extremity analyses, the Quadratic term that was
entered in Step 2 of the regression was non-significant for
the relationship between Political Orientation and Uncertainty-
Avoidance, β = 0.04, t = 0.70, p = 0.485, bootstrapped
b = 0.01, 95%BCa CI [−0.01, 0.03], and Political Orientation
and Threat (Hypothesis 2a), β = −0.01, t = −0.26, p = 0.794,
bootstrapped b < 0.01, 95%BCa CI [−0.03, 0.03], which
again replicated Jost et al. (2003, 2007). In addition, in
separate regressions, the Quadratic term was non-significant
for Political Orientation relationships with Explicit Attitudes
(Hypothesis 2b), R2 = 0.002, β = −0.04, t = −0.78, p = 0.434,
bootstrapped b = −0.01, 95%BCa CI [−0.05, 0.03], with
Implicit Attitudes (Hypothesis 2b), R2 < 0.001, β < 0.001,
t = 0.21, p = 0.834, bootstrapped b < 0.01, 95%BCa CI
[−0.01, 0.01], and with z-Averaged Attitudes, R2 < 0.001,
β < 0.001, t = 0.66, p = 0.509, bootstrapped b = 0.01,
95%BCa CI [−0.01, 0.03]. It was, however, significant for the
Explicit Negative Attitudes variable (Hypothesis 2b), R2 = 0.01,
β = 0.10, t = 2.03, p = 0.043, bootstrapped b = 0.04,
95%BCa CI [−0.01, 0.08], but with a small effect size
(R2 = 0.01 is at the bottom of the small effect size range of
R2 = 0.01 to R2 = 0.059).
Mediations
To examine the multiple-mediation hypothesis for Uncertainty-
Avoidance and Perceived Threat from Immigrants (r = 0.242),
we conducted separate, multiple-mediation analyses for
the relationships between Political Orientation and Explicit
Attitudes, Political Orientation and Explicit Negative
Attitudes, Political Orientation and Implicit Attitudes, and
Political Orientation and standardized-Averaged Attitudes. As
hypothesized, both Uncertainty-Avoidance and Perceived Threat
had significant indirect effects on Explicit Attitudes (see Figure 4;
Hypothesis 1c), and Threat was a larger mediator, comparison
b = −0.30, CI [−0.38, −0.23]. In a separate mediation, both
Uncertainty-Avoidance and Perceived Threat had significant
indirect effects on Negative Attitudes (see Figure 5; Hypothesis
1c), and again Threat was a larger mediator, comparison
b = −0.31, CI [−0.41, −0.22]. For standardized-Averaged
Attitudes, both Uncertainty-Avoidance and Perceived Threat had
significant indirect effects on standardized-Averaged Attitudes
(see Figure 7). In contrast to expectations, Uncertainty-
Avoidance was not a significant mediator when Threat was
within the multiple-mediation model for Implicit Attitudes (see
Figure 6; Hypothesis 1c).
Both mediators were significant when entered into separate
mediations for the relationship between Political Orientation and
Explicit Attitudes (Uncertainty-Avoidance, b =−0.03, CI [−0.06,
−0.02], R2 = 0.06, CSIE =−0.05, and Perceived Threat, b =−0.33,
CI [−0.41, −0.26], R2 = 0.23, CSIE = −0.48]), and separate
mediations for the relationship between Political Orientation and
Explicit Negative Attitudes (Uncertainty-Avoidance b = −0.03,
CI [−0.07,−0.01], R2 = 0.05, CSIE =−0.04, and Perceived Threat
b =−0.33, CI [−0.44,−0.25], R2 = 0.24, CSIE =−0.41). However,
for the relationship between Political Orientation and Implicit
Attitudes, Uncertainty-Avoidance was not significant, b = 0.0008,
CI [−0.0024, 0.0048], R2 = 0.003, CSIE = 0.006, while Perceived
Threat was significant b = −0.02, CI [−0.03, −0.01], R2 = 0.09,
CSIE =−0.13, when entered alone.
The Left-Right measure of Political Orientation produced the
same pattern of results and levels of significance for all analyses,
except that the Uncertainty-Avoidance indirect effect was not
significant within the multiple-mediation including threat on
the standardized-Averaged Attitudes measure. After removing an
additional four participants who failed to verify that they were
born in the US within the Study 3 demographic questions (308
participants), all patterns and levels of significance were the same
for the Left-Right measure. Again, for the main political variable,
all patterns of results and levels of significance remained the same
for all analyses in this sample of 308 participants.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our findings support research on the divide between liberals
and conservatives by highlighting the importance that differences
in threat management and uncertainty-avoidance play in
explaining political differences. In three studies, we provided
consistent evidence that the Uncertainty-Threat Model predicts
relationships of political orientation to threat and uncertainty-
avoidance, that it can be extended to an intergroup context of
immigration, and that it predicts attitude differences for liberals
and conservatives in relation to immigrants. Moreover, both
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FIGURE 4 | Simultaneous, multiple mediation of political orientation to explicit attitudes toward immigrants with perceived threat from immigrants and
uncertainty-avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test.
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FIGURE 5 | Simultaneous, multiple mediation of political orientation to explicit negative attitudes toward immigrants with perceived threat from immigrants and
uncertainty-avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test.
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FIGURE 6 | Simultaneous, multiple mediation of political orientation to implicit attitudes with perceived threat from immigrants and uncertainty-avoidance as
mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test.
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FIGURE 7 | Simultaneous, multiple mediation of political orientation to standardized-averaged attitudes with perceived threat from immigrants and
uncertainty-avoidance as mediators. Brackets represent 95% bias corrected confidence intervals from a 5000-sample bootstrap test.
measured dispositional variables of uncertainty-avoidance and
perceived threat concerns mediated the relationship between
more liberalism and less negative attitudes within an intergroup
context related to immigrants (Hypothesis 1c). In Study 1,
measured uncertainty-avoidance and perceived threats from
immigrants mediated the political orientation to attitudes
toward immigrants relationship; they did so within both a
multiple-mediation model and as separate mediators. Within the
multiple-mediation model that included uncertainty-avoidance,
the perceived threat mediator was shown to be significantly more
influential than uncertainty-avoidance on the relationship. Our
research demonstrated the mediation in relation to attitudes
toward immigrants, and it also extended threat management
beyond the concepts of systemic threat from terrorism, belief
in a dangerous world, and death anxiety (Jost et al., 2007). In
Study 2, perceived threat was again extended from perceived
threat from immigrants to perceived threat from (unspecified)
outgroups, and attitudes were extended to include a measure
focusing on only negativity. Both uncertainty-avoidance and
perceived-threat from (unspecified) outgroups mediated the
relationship between more liberalism and less negativity toward
immigrants, on both attitude measures. In Study 3, we replicated
all findings with the exception of the mediational analysis
for the Implicit Attitudes measure. Interestingly, this indirect
attitude measure appears to be more tied to threat than we
had previously believed because threat was the only significant
mediator of the relationship within either mediation model.
However, an additional analysis on the averaged attitude measure
(average of Explicit Attitudes, Explicit Negative Attitudes, and
Implicit Attitudes) revealed that both uncertainty-avoidance
and perceived-threat from immigrants significantly mediated
the political orientation to averaged attitudes relationship; a
combined analysis of Explicit Attitudes and Explicit Negative
Attitudes from Study 2 also revealed the same significant
mediation for uncertainty-avoidance and general threat.
In our research, we mainly observed evidence supporting
the uncertainty-threat model (i.e., linear relationship between
political ideology and threat and uncertainty-avoidance
[Hypothesis 2a], and between political ideology and attitudes
toward immigrants [Hypothesis 2b]), and we did not observe
much support for the extremity hypothesis (i.e., a quadratic
relationship; van Prooijen et al., 2015). The extremity hypothesis
from the worldview perspective proposes that people at either
the left or right extreme on the political spectrum should
show more extreme reactions than people at the middle of the
distribution (Greenberg and Jonas, 2003). Jost et al. (2007) and
van Prooijen et al. (2015) used a quadratic regression to test this
hypothesis. In accordance with Jost et al.’s findings, we did not
observe support for the extremity effect in relation to threat and
uncertainty-avoidance in three studies with appropriate sample
sizes (206, 308, and 312 participants had 0.8 power to observe
an R2 of 0.025-−0.04) and using a general population and not
samples using undergraduate students. In addition, van Prooijen
and colleagues demonstrated that people on the extreme left
and right showed more derogation of immigrants and more
derogation of societal groups in general. In our three studies, we
did not find evidence of this extremity hypothesis for 5 of the 6
attitude analyses. We, instead, observed a significant linear effect
in 5 analyses in which liberals showed less negative attitudes, but
we did not observe the significant quadratic effect; participants
at the extreme ends did not show more bias than moderates.
We, however, did observe a significant extremity effect on the
Negative Attitude measure, but only in Study 3 with a small effect
size (R2 of 0.01), which matches van Prooijen’s effect size of an
R2 of 0.01 (van Prooijen et al., 2015). In their research, they used
an extremely large sample of 7,553 participants and observed the
same, small change in R2 of 0.01 (derogation of immigrants) that
we observed with 312 participants in our Study 3; the extremity
hypothesis effects were all smaller than 0.01 in our other samples
of 206 and 308 participants in our Studies 1 and 2. Thus, given
that the extremity hypothesis effect size was no larger than an
R2 of 0.01 in samples of 7,553, 206, 308, and 312 participants,
it is reasonable to assume that an R2 of 0.01 might be a good
approximation of this effect size in relation to immigrants.
We, however, did not include a measure of derogation to
societal groups as van Prooijen and colleagues did and for
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which they observed a larger effect size (R2 = 0.03). So, using
other groups may be related to a larger effect. Yet, it may
also be related to methodology because they tested attitudes
to multiple groups simultaneously, instead of individually,
which could have changed responses compared to rating a
single group such as immigrants. Question order effects have
been observed in social cognition research in which an earlier
question frames the questions that follow; thus, the use of
multiple groups could affect the responses (Schwarz et al., 1990;
Schuldt et al., 2015). This is an empirical question for future
studies to tackle.
We also analyzed the type of threat we used within our
research. A recent review has indicated that threat has been
defined within the motivated social cognition perspective (Jost
et al., 2003; Jost, 2017) in a way that may miss differences
(Crawford, 2017). This review suggests that physical threat (i.e.,
more concrete concerns regarding violation of physical safety
through the potential of death or physical harm) and meaning
threats (i.e., more abstract threats to systems of meaning and
values) have often been conflated. They argue that liberals and
conservatives respond differently to physical threats, but that
they usually respond in a similar manner to meaning threats.
Within our current research, we did not focus on physical
threats. Instead we focused on perceived threats based upon the
ITT perspective (Stephan et al., 2009, 2015; Rios et al., 2018)
that has not distinguished between perceived realistic threats
about competition for resources (e.g., taking jobs; using social
services) and perceived realistic threats about physical safety
(e.g., threats of death or physical trauma). The ITT theory
has instead focused on perceived threats to symbolic values
and threats to resources of one’s groups. Thus, the standard
perceived threat measure that we used (Stephan et al., 1999, 2009)
assessed perceived threats to resources and perceived threats to
symbolic values, but to date, has not measured threats from
the potential of death or other physical harm even though
it could; As a result, the measure of perceived threats that
we used was closer to measuring meaning threats. Contrary
to the review of meaning threats, we observed that liberals
and conservatives responded differently to perceived threats
(i.e., combined perceived realistic and symbolic threat similar
to meaning threats), and even the symbolic threat subscale
entirely replicated the differential relationship to political
ideology and the mediations to implicit and explicit attitudes
toward immigrants.
In relation to uncertainty, we had used personality measures
of uncertainty-avoidance that had been used previously
(Jost et al., 2007; Jost and Napier, 2012). Over our three
studies, we observed a weighted-average beta between Political
Ideology and Uncertainty-Avoidance of 0.25 (R2 = 0.06);
while this was a moderate effect size and was the reason we
kept it throughout our three studies, the weighted-average
beta observed by Jost et al. (2007) was higher (0.41). We
have reviewed the recent research by Jost (2017) and Jost
et al. (2017) and have noted that Uncertainty-Avoidance
may have a larger correlation with Political Ideology when
more of the items of Need for Closure or Need for Structure
are included within the measures of uncertainty-avoidance.
Thus, future research may improve the measurement of
Uncertainty-Avoidance by including Need for Cognitive Closure
within this measure.
The current research provides a good initial test of the
chronic dispositional hypotheses that can be derived from the
Uncertainty-Threat Model, but there are some limitations. Given
that this research was an initial test, it was correlational
and limited to only demonstrating associations for the
Uncertainty-Threat Model and its relationships to attitudes
toward immigrants, though we did use methods to improve
the correlational studies. For the mediational analyses, by
measuring the mediators after political ideology, and attitudes
after the mediators, it is known that the mediators did not
influence participants’ ratings of political ideology within
the study because the political ratings occurred first, and
that attitudes did not influence participants’ ratings of the
mediators or political ideology (Kenny et al., 1998; Cohen
et al., 2003). However, rating political ideology could have had
an influence on the later measures, though this a common
issue with political studies. Thus, future research could alter
the order of these variables to fully demonstrate that those
orders did not influence ratings. Moreover, future research
could experimentally test the hypotheses generated by this
model in order to examine the Uncertainty-Threat Model’s
proposal that temporarily activating uncertainty and threat
may induce a conservative shift in addition to the effects
observed with chronic, dispositional measures. This is a
question that the current research is not able to answer.
Another limitation is the nature of the perceived threat
that we measured. According to ITT, perceived realistic
threats can be about both competition for resources (e.g.,
taking jobs; using social services) and about physical safety
(e.g., being physically hurt). The standard measures used
for measuring perceived threat based upon ITT have not
measured threats to physical safety at the concrete or
conceptual level, but according to the theory, there is room
for incorporating such items (Stephan et al., 1999, 2002).
If those physical safety items were to be included, we may
see differences between the realistic and perceived threat
subscales, which is often not observed on the usual measures
(Rios et al., 2018). Thus, more research on the nature of
this measure will need to be conducted to test how well it
taps meaning threats as opposed to physical threats, and
whether physical threats can be measured more broadly and
less concretely.
In addition to showing support for the Uncertainty-
Threat Model, this research extended the model to perceived
threat from outgroups, both to specific outgroups (i.e.,
immigrants) and to unspecified outgroups much like
SDO does with unspecified groups, and it extended
threat beyond systemic threat from terrorism, belief in a
dangerous world, or death anxiety (Jost et al., 2007). In
Study 1, we used a validated measure of perceived threat
from immigrants and found a significant mediation of
the relationship between more liberalism and less negative
attitudes toward immigrants (Stephan et al., 1999). In Study
2, we extended this research by testing the model with a
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measure of perceived threat from unspecified outgroups and
observed a similar significant mediation; moreover, the use of
unspecified groups in the threat measure, but “immigrants”
in the attitude measures removed common target bias effects
and improved generalizability. In Study 3, we returned to the
measure of perceived threat from immigrants and demonstrated
its mediation of the political orientation to attitudes effect
for an objective, indirect measure of attitudes. Moreover, in
all three studies, perceived threat was a significantly more
influential mediator than uncertainty-avoidance within the
multiple-mediation model. This effect highlights the importance
that perceived threat may play in differentiating liberals and
conservatives and may provide a topic to bridge the divide on the
immigration debates currently occurring worldwide.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
A key difference between liberals and conservatives may be their
responsiveness to perceived threats or risks and uncertainty (Jost
et al., 2017) instead of differences in negativity bias as proposed
by some theorists (Hibbing et al., 2014). Other researchers have
begun to show that liberals and conservatives may differ in
relation to threats (Oxley et al., 2008; Thórisdóttir and Jost, 2011;
Terrizzi et al., 2013). In other recent research, conservatism was
positively related to self-restraint and social-order dimensions of
the Moral Motives Model (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2007), both of
which could be said to be related to differences in responsiveness
to social threats. Discussing these differences in terms of people
having different responsiveness to threat, as opposed to wanting
to be socially dominant or having a general negativity bias, allows
for a constructive debate that may reduce the focus of casting
either group in a negative light. Differences in responsiveness
to threat can be adaptive in different circumstances and having
a balance of both may be beneficial to society (Janoff-Bulman
and Carnes, 2016). If we are able to acknowledge the perceived
threats, it allows for the discussion of the benefits of immigration
to the overall economy, while also discussing the problems
with immigration hurting the poor with whom immigrants
occasionally compete for jobs. It allows us to focus on helping
immigrants learn new, societal systems and to improve the shared
focus on the ideals of the principles of democracy rather than
on dividing us on cultural differences defined by blood ties and
heritage. It permits these groups to discuss issues related to threat
in ways that may acknowledge and offer solutions to differences
in threat and perhaps move the debate forward and toward the
promise of democracy instead of further dividing us.
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